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"Or of the Press"t*
By
POTTER STEWART*
I turn this morning to an inquiry into an aspect of constitutional
law that has only recently begun to engage the attention of the
Supreme Court. Specifically, I shall discuss the role of the organized
press-of the daily newspapers and other established news media-in
the system of government created by our Constitution.
It was less than a decade ago-during the Vietnam years-that
the people of our country began to become aware of the twin
phenomena on a national scale of so-called investigative reporting
and an adversary press-that is, a press adversary to the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government. And only in the two short years
that culminated last summer in the resignation of a President did we
fully realize the enormous power that an investigative and adversary
press can exert.
The public opinion polls that I have seen indicate that some
Americans firmly believe that the former Vice President and former
President of the United States were hounded out of office by an
arrogant and irresponsible press that had outrageously usurped
dictatorial power. And it seems clear that many more Americans,
while appreciating and even applauding the service performed by the
press in exposing official wrongdoing at the highest levels of our
national government, are nonetheless deeply disturbed by what they
consider to be the illegitimate power of the organized press in the
political structure of our society. It is my thesis this morning that, on
the contrary, the established American press in the past ten years,
and particularly in the past two years, has performed precisely the
function it was intended to perform by those who wrote the First
Amendment of our Constitution. I further submit that this thesis is
' This article was first published in 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975).
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supported by the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court.
Surprisingly, despite the importance of newspapers in the
political and social life of our country the Supreme Court has not
until very recently been called upon to delineate their constitutional
role in our structure of government.
Our history is filled with struggles over the rights and
prerogatives of the press, but these disputes rarely found their way to
the Supreme Court. The early years of the Republic witnessed
controversy over the constitutional validity of the short-lived Alien
and Sedition Act, but the controversy never reached the Court. In
the next half century there was nationwide turmoil over the right of
the organized press to advocate the then subversive view that slavery
should be abolished. In Illinois a publisher was killed for publishing
abolitionist views. But none of this history made First Amendment
law because the Court had earlier held that the Bill of Rights applied
only against the Federal Government, not against the individual
states.
With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
constitutional framework was modified, and by the 1920's the Court
had established that the protections of the First Amendment extend
against all government-federal, state, and local.
The next fifty years witnessed a great outpouring of First
Amendment litigation, all of which inspired books and articles
beyond number. But, with few exceptions, neither these First
Amendment cases nor their commentators squarely considered the
Constitution's guarantee of a Free Press. Instead, the focus was on its
guarantee of free speech. The Court's decisions dealt with the rights
of isolated individuals, or of unpopular minority groups, to stand up
against governmental power representing an angry or frightened
majority. The cases that came to the Court during those years
involved the rights of the soapbox orator, the nonconformist
pamphleteer, the religious evangelist. The Court was seldom asked to
define the rights and privileges, or the responsibilities, of the
organized press.
In very recent years cases involving the established press finally
have begun to reach the Supreme Court, and they have presented a
variety of problems, sometimes arising in complicated factual settings.
In a series of cases, the Court has been called upon to consider
the limits imposed by the free press guarantee upon a state's common
or statutory law of libel. As a result of those cases, a public figure
cannot successfully sue a publisher for libel unless he can show that
the publisher maliciously printed a damaging untruth.'
1. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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The Court has also been called upon to decide whether a
newspaper reporter has a First Amendment privilege to refuse to
disclose his confidential sources to a grand jury. By a divided vote, the
Court found no such privilege to exist in the circumstances of the
cases before it.2

In another noteworthy case, the Court was asked by the Justice
Department to restrain publication by the New York Times and other
of the so-called Pentagon Papers. The Court declined to
newspapers
3
do so.

In yet another case, the question to be decided was whether
political groups have a First Amendment or statutory right of access
to the federally regulated broadcast channels of 4radio and television.
The Court held there was no such right of access.
Last Term the Court confronted a Florida statute that required
newspapers to grant a "right of reply" to political candidates they had
criticized. The Court unanimously5held this statute to be inconsistent
with the guarantees of a free press.
It seems to me that the Court's approach to all these cases has
uniformly reflected its understanding that the Free Press guarantee is,
in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution. Most of the
other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties or
specific rights of individuals: freedom of speech, freedom of worship,
the right to counsel, the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, to name a few. In contrast, the Free Press Clause
extends protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in
short, the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection.
This basic understanding is essential, I think, to avoid an
elementary error of constitutional law. It is tempting to suggest that
freedom of the press means only that newspaper publishers are
guaranteed freedom of expression. They are guaranteed that
freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free Speech
Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy. Between 1776
and the drafting of our Constitution, many of the state constitutions
contained clauses protecting freedom of the press while at the same
time recognizing no general freedom of speech. By including both
guarantees in the First Amendment, the Founders quite clearly
recognized the distinction between the two.
It is also a mistake to suppose that the only purpose of the
2.
3.
4.
5.

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
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constitutional guarantee of a free press is to insure that a newspaper
will serve as a neutral forum for debate, a "market place for ideas," a
kind of Hyde Park corner for the community. A related theory sees
the press as a neutral conduit of information between the people and
their elected leaders. These theories, in my view, again give
insufficient weight to the institutional autonomy of the press that it
was the purpose of the Constitution to guarantee.
In setting up the three branches of the Federal Government, the
Founders deliberately created an6 internally competitive system. As
Mr. Justice Brandeis once wrote:
The [Founders'] purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy.
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free
press was a similar one: to create a fourth institution outside the
Government as an additional check on the three official branches.
Consider the opening words of the Free Press Clause of the
Massachusetts Constitution, drafted by John Adams:
The liberty of the press is essential to the security of the state.
The relevant metaphor, I think, is the metaphor of the Fourth
Estate. What Thomas Carlyle wrote about the British Government a
century ago has a curiously contemporary ring:
Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the
Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more
important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech or witty
saying; it is a literal fact-very momentus to us in these times.
For centuries before our Revolution, the press in England had
been licensed, censored, and bedeviled by prosecutions for seditious
libel. The British Crown knew that a free press was not just a neutral
vehicle for the balanced discussion of diverse ideas. Instead, the free
press meant organized, expert scrutiny of government. The press was
a conspiracy of the intellect, with the courage of numbers. This
formidable check on official power was what the British Crown had
feared-and what the American Founders decided to risk.
It is this constitutional understanding, I think, that provides the
unifying principle underlying the Supreme Court's recent decisions
dealing with the organized press.
Consider first the libel cases. Officials within the three
governmental branches are, for all practical purposes, immune from
libel and slander suits for statements that they make in the line of
duty 7 This immunity, which has both constitutional and common law
6. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,293 (1926) (dissenting opinion).
7. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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origins, aims to insure bold and vigorous prosecution of the public's
business. The same basic reasoning applies to the press. By contrast,
the Court has never suggested that the constitutional right of free
speech gives an individual any immunity from liability for either libel
or slander.
In the cases involving the newspaper reporters' claims that they
had a constitutional privilege not to disclose their confidential news
sources to a grand jury, the Court rejected the claims by a vote of five
to four, or, considering Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion,
perhaps by a vote of four and a half to four and a half. But if freedom
of the press means simply freedom of speech for reporters, this
question of a reporter's asserted right to withhold information would
have answered itself. None of us-as individuals-has a "free
speech" right to refuse to tell a grand jury the identity of someone
who has given us information relevant to the grand jury's legitimate
inquiry. Only if a reporter is a representative of a protected
institution does the question become a different one. The members of
the Court disagreed in answering the question, but the question did
not answer itself.
The cases involving the so-called "right of access" to the press
raised the issue whether the First Amendment allows government, or
indeed requires government, to regulate the press so as to make it a
genuinely fair and open "market place for ideas." The Court's
answer was "no" to both questions. If a newspaper wants to serve as
a neutral market place for debate, that is an objective which it is free
to choose. And, within limits, that choice is probably necessary to
But it is a choice that
commercially successful journalism.
government cannot constitutionally impose.
Finally the Pentagon Papers case involved the line between
secrecy and openness in the affairs of Government. The question, or
at least one question, was whether that line is drawn by the
Constitution itself. The Justice Department asked the Court to find
in the Constitution a basis for prohibiting the publication of allegedly
stolen government documents. The Court could find no such
prohibition. So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press
may publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can.
But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to do battle
against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot
expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed.
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular
government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy.8 The public's interest in knowing about its government
8. Cf Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 94 S. Ct.
2811 (1974).
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is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is
indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information
Act nor an Official Secrets Act.
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its
resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some
instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the
political forces in American society.
Newspapers, television networks, and magazines have sometimes
been outrageously abusive, untruthful, arrogant, and hypocritical.
But it hardly follows that elimination of a strong and independent
press is the way to eliminate abusiveness, untruth, arrogance, or
hypocrisy from government itself.
It is quite possible to conceive of the survival of our Republic
without an autonomous press. For openness and honesty in
government, for an adequate flow of information between the people
and their representatives, for a sufficient check on autocracy and
despotism, the traditional competition between the three branches of
government, supplemented by vigorous political activity, might be
enough.
The press could be relegated to the status of a public utility. The
guarantee of free speech would presumably put some limitation on
the regulation to which the press could be subjected. But if there
were no guarantee of a free press, government could convert the
communications media into a neutral "market place of ideas."
Newspapers and television networks could then be required to
promote contemporary government policy or current notions of social
justice. 9
Such a constitution is possible; it might work reasonably well.
But it is not the Constitution the Founders wrote. It is not the
Constitution that has carried us through nearly two centuries of
national life. Perhaps our liberties might survive without an
independent established press. But the Founders doubted it, and, in
the year 1974, I think we can all be thankful for their doubts.

9. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).

